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Abstract
We formally deﬁne a notion of credit and responsibility within the Generalized Non Deducibility
on Compositions framework. We investigate the validity of our deﬁnitions through some examples
discussed in the literature.
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1 Overview
Formal methods and tools have been successfully applied for the analysis of
security properties of communication protocols. The protocol under inves-
tigation is described in a given language, then a formal speciﬁcation of the
security property to be analyzed is deﬁned. Whether or not the security prop-
erty is fulﬁlled is investigated by formally analyzing the protocol in a hostile
environment, i.e., considering the presence of an adversary running in parallel
with the honest participants.
Both the property’s formal speciﬁcation and its informal deﬁnition are cru-
cial steps for the analysis. Indeed, even a common notion as authentication
is usually considered a slippery security property (see [8]). Several deﬁnitions
have been proposed in the security community. Henceforth, to deﬁne a formal
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model for authentication is a tricky task and many diﬀerent formalisms ac-
tually exist [2,3,5,8,11,13,14,15]. Their expressiveness, usability and accuracy
are often questioned, e.g. [8], and some eﬀort has been devoted to compare
them. In [4] three diﬀerent authentication properties are compared, and the
comparison is carried out within the Generalized Non Deducibility on Com-
positions schema (GNDC, [7,5]). GNDC has been proposed for deﬁning and
analyzing security properties and it is based on the notion of non-interference.
In this paper, we try to formally capture the meaning of two diﬀerent
ﬂavors of authentication, credit and responsibility. Abadi ﬁrst focused his at-
tention on these two properties in [1], arguing about two possible uses of an
authenticated message m. Suppose that a principal A sends the message to a
principal B. Then, as far as responsibility is concerned, “B may believe that m
is being supported by A’s authority”. Also, as far as credit is concerned, “B
may attribute credit for m to A”. Abadi expresses the concepts of credit and
responsibility through several examples, by discussing their distinction in the
design and analysis of protocols. Diﬀerent cryptographic operators (digital sig-
natures, encryptions, decryptions) may lead either to responsibility or credit.
Our investigation starts from the intuitions of Abadi by rephrasing them: we
suggest that responsibility supports orders, i.e., public messages which speak
for some principal, while credit is related to a principal for secret messages
known in advance only by that principal, that wants to be acknowledged as
the holder of the secret messages.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls the GNDC
schema used for modeling security properties. Section 3 deﬁnes credit and re-
sponsibility within GNDC. Section 4 considers some of the protocols analyzed
by Abadi in [1]. It is checked if these protocols meet our formal deﬁnitions.
Section 5 provides a sketch of a formal comparison between the two properties.
Section 6 concludes the paper. The interested reader will ﬁnd in the Appendix
the syntax and semantics of the language used for specifying cryptographic
protocols.
2 A General Schema for Security Properties
In this section we present the general schema GNDC for the deﬁnition of
security properties given in [7,5]. We assume some familiarity with process
algebras. Further, throughout the paper we specify protocols and properties
through Crypto-CCS, [7], basically process algebra CCS with cryptographic
modeling constructs. The syntax and semantics of the language can be found
in the Appendix.
Informally, the GNDC schema states that a system speciﬁcation P satisﬁes
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property GNDC α(P ) if the behaviour of P , despite the presence of a hostile
environment EφC that can interact with P only through a set of channels in C,
appears to be same (w.r.t. a behavioral relation  of observational equivalence)
as the behaviour of a modiﬁed version α(P ) of P that represents the expected
(correct) behaviour of P . The GNDC schema thus has the form
P ∈ GNDC α(P ) iﬀ ∀X ∈ E
φ
C : (P ‖ X)\C  α(P ), (1)
where (P ‖ X)\C denotes the parallel composition of processes P and X
restricted to communication over channels other than C. By varying parame-
ters  and α a variety of security properties can be formulated in the GNDC
schema, [6].
In (1) there is an additional constraint that is required in the speciﬁc
context of analyzing cryptographic protocols: the static (initial) knowledge
of the hostile environment must be bound to a speciﬁc set of messages. This
limitation is needed to avoid a too strong hostile environment that would be
able to corrupt any secret (as it would know all cryptographic keys, etc.).
Formally, EφC just represents all processes communicating through channels
in C and having an initial knowledge bound by φ. We consider as hostile
processes only the ones belonging to EφC.
Obviously, with a speciﬁc formal framework in mind, e.g. a CCS-like
process algebra, all symbols in (1) need to be instantiated. Consider the
instance
P ∈ GNDC
α(P )
≤trace
iﬀ ∀X ∈ EφC : (P ‖ X)\C ≤trace α(P ) (2)
of GNDC. Here, the trace inclusion relation has been instantiated as a be-
havioral relation  of observational equivalence. Trace inclusion is deﬁned as
follows: we say that the traces of P are included in the traces of Q (P ≤trace Q)
iﬀ whenever P can move from the state P to the state P ′ through a sequence
of actions γ, then also Q can do the same, apart from internal actions of
P and Q. The trace inclusion relation is commonly used for the analysis of
safety properties. When ≤trace is considered, there exists a suﬃcient criterion
for the static characterization (i.e., not involving the universal predicate ∀) of
GNDC α(P ) (for further details, see [7,5]).
3 Deﬁning Responsibility and Credit within the GNDC
schema
According to Abadi [1], “Authentication can serve both for assigning responsi-
bility and for giving credit”. He concludes that some authentication protocols
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are adequate for applications requiring responsibility but not necessarily for
applications requiring credit and vice versa. Hence, he claims the need to
better clarify whether the properties of an authentication protocol suﬃce for
establishing responsibility and/or credit.
We believe that responsibility and credit can be deﬁned similarly to the
characterization of the correspondance property given in [15] (note that cor-
respondance was called agreement in [11], upon being formalized in the CSP
process algebra, [13]). What is technically done in the characterization of the
agreement property is to give each principal the possibility to perform control
actions, expressing the current local view of the computation. These con-
trol actions are inserted in the speciﬁcation of a protocol only for veriﬁcation
purposes and the principals cannot exploit them during the protocol run.
Note that the use of the correspondance actions and, consequently, the one
of the agreement actions, are considered a well-founded mechanism to specify
and correctly evaluate authentication properties (see [9]).
3.1 Assigning responsibility
We formally deﬁne here the responsibility property. Assigning responsibility
to a principal A for a public message M 1 speciﬁes that M is supported by
A’s authority. We give the following intuitive explanation of the property:
“A principal B may assign responsibility to a principal A for a public mes-
sage M iff A explicitly sent M to B.
Our informal interpretation ﬁnds its motivation in everyday life, where who
actually claims something is generally considered responsible for what he
claimed.
To formally model the property we exploit a pair of control actions. We
deﬁne control actions corresponding to accepting responsibility and, sym-
metrically, assigning responsibility. We shall write accept resp (A,B,M)
meaning that “A accepts responsibility from B for message M”, and
assign resp (B,A,M) meaning that “B assigns responsibility to A for mes-
sage M”.
The property is speciﬁed as follows:
αAR(P ) = ‖(x,y,m)∈D(P ) accept resp (x, y,m).assign resp (y, x,m)
where P is a protocol instance and D(P) is the set of all possible deliveries
one wishes to consider. A delivery is a triple (x, y,m), where x is the sender
1 A public message is a message possibly known by all the principals.
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of message m and y the receiver. αAR(P ) is speciﬁed in Crypto-CCS. If Q is
a term in the algebra, then ch (msg).Q is the process that sends message msg
on channel ch and then behaves as Q.
Example 3.1 Consider a protocol instance P where we have a honest user
A, a malicious one E and a bank B. Assume that A (E) sends a message M
(M ′) to B, then the set D(P ) is {(A,B,M), (E,B,M ′)}.
We formulate responsibility within the GNDC schema as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.2 P satisﬁes Assigning Responsibility iﬀ P is GNDC
αAR(P )
≤trace
.
Thus, a protocol enjoys Assigning Responsibility iﬀ, in each computation,
the act of giving each responsibility is preceded by the accepting of such a
responsibility. We remark that, since we consider a trace based semantics, ac-
cepting responsibility without the corresponding assignment is not considered
an attack.
3.2 Giving credit
We formally deﬁne here the credit property. Giving credit to a principal A for a
message M speciﬁes that A asks credit for a particular piece of information. In
a nutshell, we believe that this notion is similar to responsibility where only
secret messages are taken into account 2 . Therefore, we give the following
intuitive explanation of the property:
“A principal B may give credit to a principal A for a secret message M iff
only A initially knows M and A wants credit for M from B”.
Namely, in order to get credit from B, A should convince B that message M is
possessed by A itself. As an example, suppose B rules a scientiﬁc committee
and A is a scientist that discovers a treatment for a disease considered hard
to cure up to now. Accordingly, A sends to B a message whose meaning may
be roughly expressed as: “I discover the treatment for X. The treatment is
Y. I require the paternity for such a discovery.” First, B should authenticate
the message as coming from A and being actually originated by A. Then, B
should give credit to A (i.e., B should give A the paternity for the medical
discovery). Y can be something that B does not know in advance, but that
can be easily veriﬁed by B. As another example, suppose indeed that B rules
a quiz show. Some external trusted third party, e.g. a notary, can previously
give to B the digest of the right answer. Upon receiving the answer from A,
2 A message is secret for a principal A when it is not known by other principals in a protocol
except A.
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B veriﬁes its correctness by comparing the digests. If they are equal, B may
give credit to A for the answer.
To formally model the credit property we introduce a new pair of control
actions. We represent a credit request from A to B by the action ask cre ,
and a credit giving by the action give cre . The protocol should ensure that
B gives credit to A only if A required it. This requirement is captured by the
following speciﬁcation:
αGC(P ) = ‖(x,y,m)∈D(P ) ask cre (x, y,m).give cre (y, x,m)
A particular characterization of the set D(P ) is crucial in the above deﬁnition
of the credit property. With respect to the deﬁnition of responsibility given
in Subsection 3.1, we put a constraint on D(P ) to model the fact that we do
not consider public values. We assume that it is not possible to have two (or
more) triples in D(P ) with the same message m. By means of this constraint
we assume that only one principal is in the position to ask credit for a certain
message. We call this assumption “the message uniqueness” condition.
When modeling a protocol, we usually describe only the honest agents
running the protocol. However, in this particular framework, the set D(P ) of
correct deliveries should also take into account the deliveries of possible mali-
cious users. In particular, such deliveries must consider each possible message
belonging to the knowledge of a malicious user (and apart from private mes-
sages of other users). We call this assumption “the correct sending capability”
condition.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Assume that D(P ) satisﬁes the message uniqueness condition
and the correct sending capability condition. Then, P satisﬁes Giving Credit
iﬀ P is GNDC
αGC (P )
≤trace
.
In terms of traces, if an action give cre(B,A,M) exists in the trace, then
an action ask cre(A,B,M) must previously occur within the same trace.
In the following section, we consider some of the protocols analyzed by
Abadi in [1] and we check if these protocols meet our formal deﬁnitions for
credit and responsibility.
4 Examples
4.1 First Example
The ﬁrst protocol analyzed in [1] shows how to send a short-term public key K
from a principal A to a principal B (Message 1). The short-term public key is
signed with the long-term private key of principal A, K−1A . T is a timestamp.
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A(m, k)
def
= [〈(k, A,B, T ), k−1A 〉 enc x]ask cre (A,B,m) .
c1 ((A,B), x) .[〈m, k
−1〉 enc y][〈y, kB〉 enc z]c2 ((A,B), z)
B(k)
def
= c1(y).[y snd z][〈z, k〉 dec t][t fst u][u snd b][b = B][u fst r]
[r snd a][r fst k
′]c2(w) .[w snd h][〈h, k
−1
B 〉 dec j]
[〈j, k′〉 dec g]give cre (b, a, g)
P
def
= A(M,K) ‖B(KA)
Table 1
First example.
The short-term secret key K−1 is then used in subsequent messages (e.g.,
Message 2) for signing further messages, e.g., M. The protocol assumes that
B knows A’s public key KA.
Message 1 A → B : A,B, {K,A,B, T}K−1
A
Message 2 A → B : A,B, {{M}K−1}KB
As far as credit is concerned, we wonder about the correctness of the follow-
ing interpretation of Message 1: principal A is asking principal B credit for
messages signed with K−1.
In Tab. 1, the protocol is expressed in our process algebra. The expected
control actions ask cre and give cre are opportunely inserted.
We require that principal A actually possesses M, in order to prevent man
in the middle attacks. Indeed, let us consider the attack presented in [1] (the
behaviour of the attacker is formally deﬁned in Tab. 2):
Message 1 A → E(B) : A,B, {K,A,B, T}K−1
A
Message 1’ E → B : E,B, {K,E,B, T}K−1
E
Message 2 A → E(B) : A,B, {{M}K−1}KB
Message 2’ E → B : E,B, {{M}K−1}KB
We denote an attacker pretending to be B as E(B). The attacker intercepts the
messages from A to B, replacing them with its own messages. In messages
1’ and 2’ the attacker impersonates itself. In particular, E makes a credit
request using K, and therefore E could beneﬁt from A’s request. Indeed,
when B receives Message 1’ from E, B may think that E is asking credit for
subsequent messages signed with a private key correspondent to K. (E, and
notA, is actually talking withB). In practice, E behaves badly by intercepting
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E
def
= c1(x)[x snd y] % E intercepts A’s message 1
[〈y, kA〉 dec z] % E decrypts {K,A,B, T}K−1
A
and
[〈z, k−1E 〉 enc w] % E encrypts the message under K
−1
E
c1 ((E,B), w) . % E replaces A with E and sends it
c2(j) . [j fst k] % E intercepts A’s message 2 and
c2 ((E,B), k) % replaces A with E. Then it sends to B
% the message E,B, {{M}K−1}KB
Table 2
Credit attack on the ﬁrst example.
messages but then it executes correctly the steps of the protocol, by playing
the role of itself. Note that E cannot decrypt message {{M}K−1}KB , because
it does not know K−1B . Hence, E does not possess M .
Let us consider the process P ′
.
= (P ‖E) \ {c1, c2}, c1 and c2 being the
channels over which messages 1,1’ and 2,2’ are exchanged, respectively. There
exists a trace for this process that is not a trace for αGC(P ). Indeed, if the
above mentioned attack is successfully launched, we can ﬁnd a trace in P ′
where a give cre(B,E,M) action is preceded by a ask cre(A,B,M) action.
Thus, B may give credit to E for message M even if A has previously required
credit for that message. On the contrary, given the restriction on D(P), we
cannot have two credit requests related to deliveries dealing with the same
message, i.e., A,B,M and E,B,M . Consequently, we cannot have a trace
in which give cre(B,E,M) is performed after ask cre(A,B,M) in αGC(P ).
Hence, P /∈ GNDC
αGC (P )
≤trace
. As Abadi, we conclude that the protocol is not
adequate to give credit.
We believe that responsibility is concerned with public messages, as mes-
sage {M}K−1 encrypted with KB. Hence, it would make sense assigning re-
sponsibility to E for messages it sends to B. Unfortunately, our formalization
of responsibility does not agree with Abadi’s (and our) intuitive interpreta-
tion. This formally lies in the fact that A emits an accept resp(A,B,M)
action (message m in Table 1 must be opportunely instantiated) whereas B
must perform an assign resp(B,E,M) (again, with an opportune instance
of the variables in Table 1). By allowing also attackers to issue control
actions, many apparent attacks against responsibility would disappear. If
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agent E behaves correctly in issuing control actions, then E emits the ac-
tion accept resp(E,B,M) and the correspondance with the control action
assign resp(B,E,M) is established.
We require that the emission of control actions by an adversary happens
in a fair way, i.e., whenever the adversary acts as a honest participant, then
it emits the corresponding control action. Note that, contrary to the previous
literature, here we allow adversaries to output control actions. Thus, we relax
the GNDC requirement conﬁning the adversary to interact only through a set
of channels C. Here, we also allow the adversary to output control actions over
special control channels, only for veriﬁcation purposes. Basically, we augment
the Sort of actions that an adversary can do. To this aim, we introduce the
operator ↓X s.t., given a parallel system S and a sequential process X, if
S
γ
=⇒ S ′ then γ ↓X denotes the sequence of actions performed by X during
the computation γ.
Assume that an adversary can act either as a malicious user or as a honest
one. Then, its honest behavior is described by a process RX (that is a Crypto-
CCS term) prescribing its role. RX represents the role of X. We deﬁne
the predicate HonXRX ,AR(γ) that tells us whether or not X behaves correctly
w.r.t. accept resp control actions. Informally, X behaves correctly w.r.t.
accept resp control actions iﬀ, whenever the ﬁrst action of its role is performed,
then this ﬁrst action has been preceded by an opportune accept resp action 3 .
When malicious agent can perform only accept resp control actions, the
predicate HonXRX ,AR(γ) can be deﬁned as follows:
HonXRX ,AR(γ)
iﬀ
∃y,m s.t.⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
γ ↓X= α1 . . . αn∧
∃j.2 ≤ j ≤ n : αj = FST (RX , y,m)∧
m ∈ D(φ ∪msgs(α1, . . . , αj−1))
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ → αj−1 = accept resp(X, y,m)
where FST (RX , y,m) is the ﬁrst action X performs during computation γ,
following its role RX and involving a receiver y and a message m.
A process can issue a control action involving a certain message only if
this message belongs to its knowledge after the sequence α1, . . . , αj−1. This
3 It is not necessary to study the correct behavior of the malicious user acting as the
responder in a protocol, since the absence of assign resp actions is not signiﬁcant.
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requirement is essential for our diﬀerent characterization of credit and respon-
sibility. Broadly speaking, our idea is the following. A third party can be
considered responsible for some public message it actually sends, but, when-
ever it acts according to a man in the middle scheme, it cannot have any credit
assigned for forwarding messages that it actually does not know.
We deﬁne a relation between processes which is a reﬁnement of the classical
trace inclusion relation.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The relation between processes ≤RX ,AR is deﬁned as follows:
S1 ≤RX ,AR S2 iﬀ {γ | S1
γ
=⇒ ∧HonXRX ,AR(γ)} ⊆ {γ | S2
γ
=⇒}
Thus, responsibility within the GNDC schema can ﬁnally be deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 4.2 P satisﬁes Assigning Responsibility iﬀ P is GNDC
αAR(P )
≤RX,AR
.
Similarly, we can deﬁne the predicate HonXRX ,GC and a relation ≤RX ,GC for
credit properties.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Assume that D(P ) satisﬁes the message uniqueness condition
and the correct sending capability condition. Then, P satisﬁes Giving Credit
iﬀ P is GNDCαGC (P )≤RX,GC
.
These slightly diﬀerent notions allow us to identify those possible adver-
saries that correctly follow the steps in a protocol. Let us consider again the
man in the middle attack where the enemy plays the role of itself while sending
messages to B. Now E can issue control actions. Since the encrypted commu-
nication in Message 2 prevents learning message M and due to the restriction
on D(P ), there is still a credit attack (E is indeed not allowed to ask for credit
for a message that it does not know).
On the contrary, E is no longer a hostile attacker talking about responsi-
bility. Indeed, since M is assumed to be a public message, E may issue the
control action accept resp(E,B,M). This action matches the corresponding
assign resp(B,E,M) raised by B. Thus, there is no responsibility attack.
Our latter formalization for credit and responsibility agrees with the intu-
ition provided by Abadi in [1].
4.2 Second Example
In Abadi’s second example, A transmits a session key K to B along with A’s
identity (Message 1). The message is encrypted under B’s public key KB. The
session key may then be used for further messages (e.g., Message 2 and 3).
The protocol is speciﬁed as follows:
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Message 1 A → B : {A,K}KB
Message 2 A → B : {M}K
Message 3 B → A : {M ′}K
We agree with Abadi’s intuition that the protocol is adequate for applica-
tions requiring responsibility for B. Only B can retrieve K from Message 1,
then A can reasonably hold B responsible for a message encrypted under K
(unless A did not generate the encrypted message itself. The protocol assumes
that both principals can recognize their own messages). We note also that the
presence of A’s identity in Message 1 allows B to know the principal who will
hold B responsible for subsequent messages.
On the contrary, B cannot hold A responsible for messages encrypted under
K, since Message 1 could be generated by others, pretending to be A. Indeed,
the possible issue of an assign resp(A,B,M ′) action from B will never be
preceded by the issue of the correspondent accept resp(B,A,M ′) from A.
Let us consider the credit property. Abadi suggests that this protocol seems
to give a form of “unqualiﬁed” credit to A. By including its name in Message
1, A could claim credit for messages encrypted under K. Suppose now that
A chooses K incompetently, or maliciously. In this case, a third party C can
send a message {M ′′}K to B. As a consequence C gives “unqualiﬁed” credit
to A for M”, since B may give credit to A for M” even if A has not send that
message.
This scenario contrasts with our intuition that messages for which some-
one gives us credit must be consciously sent by ourselves. According to our
deﬁnition of credit, a principal is allowed to receive credit only for “asking
credit” actions that (s)he has been able to perform. Thus, we rule out pro-
tocols giving forms of “unqualiﬁed” credit. Formally, it is easy to verify that
the protocol under investigation does not guarantee credit to A. Since Mes-
sage 1 does not provide A’s authentication, whatever adversary can attribute
messages encrypted under K to A. However, A cannot issue the control ac-
tion ask cre(A,B,M) if it does not possess M. In case, there would be an
action give cre(B,A,M) not preceded by the correspondent ask cre action
and, consequently, a credit attack.
4.3 Third Example
In his paper, Abadi gives a third example, a protocol used as a component of
Krawczyk’s SKEME protocol [10]. The protocol aims at obtaining a shared
key from two random quantities (JA and JB) that principal A and principal
B respectively invent. A and B send each other these random quantities,
encrypted with the public key of the receiver. They ﬁnally compute a shared
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key K by applying a one-way hash function to the concatenation of JA and
JB. The shared key can be used in subsequent communication between A and
B.
Message 1 A → B : {JA}KB
Message 2 B → A : {JB}KA
K = H(JA, JB)
Let us consider the following on-line attack:
Message 1 A → B : {JA}KB
Message 1’ B → C : {JA}KC
Message 2 C → A : {JC}KA
In this case A initiates the protocol with a malicious principal B, who forwards
A’s half-key to C. Both A and C compute the same shared key K (K will
not be known by B), but A mistakenly believes that it shares K with B, and
C believes that it shares K with A. This attack supposes that B makes C
believe that Message 1’ comes from A. Further, A believes Message 2 comes
from B.
According to this computation, C can claim credit to A for messages en-
crypted under K. This leads to a credit attack. Suppose indeed that com-
munications take place over channels cab, cbc and cca respectively and consider
the process P ′
.
= (A ‖B ‖C)\{cab, cbc, cca}. In our analysis framework, we can
obtain a trace in P’ s.t. an action ask cre(C,A,M ′) is observed (provided
that C possesses M’), and then a give cre(A,B,M ′) action is executed.
Similarly, there is a responsibility attack on B. Indeed, each message from
C will be assigned to B (i.e., A may think that the message is supported by
B’s authority). However, since B behaved badly, it is questionable if we have
to study responsibility attacks on B. It is worthy to investigate such attacks
when B’s behavior causes some harm to an honest agent C. As an example,
consider the case in which the message sent by C contains a password to enter
C’s secret data. A may believe that such a credential is supported by B’s
authority and consequently that B can enter C’s secret data. The message
sent from C to A could be “put on my directory the ﬁles in the common
repository protected with password p”.
Thus, in our interpretation, we have both a credit and a responsibility
attack on the responder.
5 Comparison
Informally, upon analyzing the previous examples, it would seem that giving
credit is at least as diﬃcult as assigning responsibility. In particular, if we
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restrict to consider AR only over processes s.t. D(P ) enjoys the restriction
for credit, then clearly the two notions are equal. Indeed, our deﬁnition for
credit could be imagined as a requirement of responsibility provided that the
messages for which we require responsibility are secret.
The GNDC analysis framework is suitable for formally comparing diﬀerent
security properties. Actually, since responsibility is deﬁned for public messages
while credit for secret ones, a formal comparison of the two properties is
not possible. In order to make it feasible, we need to drop the assumption
about the secrecy of messages in the credit speciﬁcation. Though maintaining
coherence with the previous formulation, another characterization could be
the following:
We have a credit attack whenever a user B gives credit to A for a message
M and either A did not ask credit from B for that message or there is
another user C who asked credit for M from B before A.
This expresses a form of race condition for asking credit. Provided a correct
environment, whenever a user is willing to ask credit for a message M , M
should be known only by itself 4 . Thus, if the protocol is correct, no one else
could try to ask credit for that message. Roughly, this means that if a protocol
satisﬁes our previous deﬁnition of credit, then it satisﬁes also the current one.
The above-mentioned characterization does not mention secret values. A
possible formalization could be the following:
P ′m =
∑
(x,y,m)∈D(P )m
ask cre (x, y,m).
(give cre (y, x,m).
‖(‖(x′,y′,m)∈D(P )m\{(x,y,m)} ask cre (x
′, y′, m)))
αGC′(P ) = ‖m∈MD P
′
m
where MD = {m | (x, y,m) ∈ D(P )} are all the possible messages that occur
in D(P ) and D(P )m = {(x, y,m) ∈ D(P )} are the triples in D(P ) containing
message m. Given a message m, only the ﬁrst request asking credit for m will
be served.
Deﬁnition 5.1 P satisﬁes Giving Credit iﬀ E is GNDC
αGC′ (P )
≤RX,GC
.
We can now perform a comparison with the responsibility property.
4 In particular circumstances, we may allow the recipient to know M too. More likely,
the recipient could simply have a way to validate the message, e.g. by having the message
digest.
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Proposition 5.2 If P enjoys credit (Def. 5.1) then P [f ] enjoys responsibility
(Def. 4.2), where f(ask cre) = accept resp and f(give cre) = assign resp.
Basically, the proof is done by noticing that, up to renaming of actions by
f , we have that αGC′(P ) ≤trace αAR(P ).
6 Conclusions
We have deﬁned a possible notion of the credit and responsibility properties
within a well-established schema for modeling and analyzing security prop-
erties. We have also considered some of the protocols analyzed by Abadi in
[1] and we checked if these protocols meet our formal deﬁnitions. We have
sketched a formal comparison between the two properties.
We conclude that our deﬁnitions of credit and responsibility almost always
adhere to Abadi’s intuitions. However, as highlighted from our studies, we
argue that credit should be considered somehow a stronger property than
responsibility, whereas [1] gives special cases where this seems not completely
reasonable. Indeed, the current work and the work in [1] diﬀer for the notion
of “unqualiﬁed credit”. Abadi allows a user C to speak for a user A. As
a consequence, A can get credit for a statement A did not make. On the
contrary, we force the user A to get credit only for messages originated by
itself.
Some aspects of these two properties have been transversally treated. In-
deed, we also put our deﬁnitions at work, and let them provide a formal
analysis for the secure emission of digital certiﬁcates in [12].
The reader should note that what have been given in this paper is only a
possible interpretation of the two properties. Thus, further studies could be
actuated, in order to investigate if other ﬂavors of the properties are coherent
with respect to Abadi’s intuitions. We remark that the choice here actuated
is likely arbitrary and other directions could be followed. As a future work,
we aim at continue these investigations, due to the relevance of the treated
topics.
Finally, we actually dealt with direct responsibility and direct credit, rather
than with delegation. It could be worthy to study how delegation can be
interpreted in our (and other) framework.
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A Crypto-CCS
The model of the language consists of sequential agents able to communicate
by exchanging messages.
The data handling part of the language consists of messages and inference
systems. Messages are the data manipulated by agents, they form a set Msgs of
terms possibly containing variables. The set Msgs is deﬁned by the grammar:
m ::= x | b | F 1(m1, . . . , mk1) | . . . | F
l(m1, . . . , mkl)
where F i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ l) are the constructors for messages, x ∈ V is a
countable set of variables, b ∈ B is a collection of basic messages and ki, for
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1 ≤ i ≤ l, gives the number of arguments of the constructor F i. Messages
without variables are closed messages.
Inference systems model the possible operations on messages. They consist
of a set of rules r, e.g., :
r =
m1 . . . mn
m0
where {m1, . . . , mn} is a set of premises (possibly empty) and m0 is the conclu-
sion. An instance of the application of rule r to closed messages mi is denoted
as m1 . . . mn r m0. Given an inference system, a deduction function D
is deﬁned such that, if φ is a ﬁnite set of closed messages, then D(φ) is the
set of closed messages that can be deduced starting from φ by applying in-
stances of the rules in the system. The syntax and semantics of Crypto-CCS
are parametric with respect to a given inference system. Example inference
systems suitable to model speciﬁc cryptographic protocols will be shown in
the following sections.
The control part of the language consists of compound systems, i.e., se-
quential agents running in parallel. The language syntax is as follows:
Compound systems: S ::= (S1 ‖S2) | S \ C | Aφ
Sequential agents: A ::= 0 | p.A | A1 + A2 | [m1 . . . mn r x]A1;A2
| [m = m′]A1;A2 | E(m1, . . . ,mn)
Prefix constructs: p ::= c!m | c?x
where m,m′, m1, . . . , mn are closed messages or variables, x is a variable, c ∈
Ch (a ﬁnite set of channels) φ is a ﬁnite set of closed messages, C is a subset
of Ch.
0 is the process that does nothing.
p.A is the process that can perform an action according to the particular
preﬁx construct p and then behaves as A. In particular,
• c!m denotes a message m sent on channel c;
• c?x denotes the receiving of a message m on channel c. The received message
replaces the variable x.
A1 + A2 represents the non deterministic choice between A and A1.
[m1 . . .mn r x]A1;A2 is the inference construct. If, by applying an in-
stance of rule r, with premises m1 . . .mn, a message m can be inferred, then
the process behaves as A1 (where m replaces x), otherwise it behaves as A2.
[m = m′]A1;A2 is the match construct, to check message equality. If
m = m′ then the system behaves as A1, otherwise it behaves as A2.
A compound system S1 ‖S2 denotes the parallel execution of S1 and S2.
S1 ‖S2 performs an action p if one of its sub-components performs p. A
synchronization, or internal action, denoted by τ , may take place whenever
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(!)
(c!m.A)φ
c!m
−→ (A)φ
(?)
m ∈ Msgs
(c?x.A)φ
c?m
−→ (A[m/x])φ∪{m}
(D)
m1 . . .mn r m (A[m/x])φ∪{m}
a
−→ (A′)φ′
([m1 . . .mn r x]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′)φ′
(‖
1
) S
a
−→ S′
S ‖S1
a
−→ S′ ‖S1
(‖
2
)
S
c!m
−→ S′ S1
c?m
−→ S′1
S ‖S1
τ
−→ S′ ‖S′1
(\1)
S
c!m
−→ S′ c /∈ L
S \ L
c!m
−→ S′ \ L
(+2)
S
a
−→ S′
S + S1
a
−→ S′
(D1)
 ∃m s.t. m1 . . .mn r m (A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
([m1 . . .mn r x]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
(=)
m = m′ (A)φ
a
−→ (A′)φ′
([m = m′]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′)φ′
(=1)
m = m′ (A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
([m = m′]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
(Const)
E(x1, . . . , xn) =def A A[m1/x1, . . . ,mn/xn]
a
−→ A1
E(m1, . . . ,mn)
a
−→ A1
Fig. A.1. Operational semantics of Crypto-CCS.
S1 and S2 are able to perform two complementary actions, i.e., send -receive
actions on the same channel.
A compound system S \ C allows only visible actions whose channels are
not in C. (Internal action τ being the invisible action).
The term Aφ is a single sequential agent whose knowledge, i.e., the set of
messages which occur in its term, is described by φ. The knowledge of an
agent increases either when it receives messages (see rule (?) in Fig. A.1) or
it infers new messages from the messages it knows (see rule D in Fig. A.1).
For every sequential agent Aφ, it is required that all the closed messages that
appear in Aφ belong to its knowledge φ.
The activities of the agents are described by the actions that they can
perform. The set Act of actions which may be performed by a compound
system ranges over by a and it is deﬁned as: Act = {c?m, c!m, τ | c ∈ C,m ∈
Msgs,m closed}. P is the set of all the Crypto-CCS closed terms (i.e., with no
free variables). sort(P) is the set of all the channels that syntactically occur
in the term P.
The operational semantics of a Crypto-CCS term is described by means
of the labeled transition system (lts, for short) 〈P, Act, {
a
−→}a∈Act〉, where
{
a
−→}a∈Act is the least relation between Crypto-CCS processes induced by the
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axioms and inference rules of Fig. A.1 (in that ﬁgure the symmetric rules for
‖1, ‖2, \1,+2 are omitted).
The expression S
a
−→ S ′ means that the system can move from the
state S to the state S ′ through the action a. The expression S =⇒ S ′ de-
notes that S and S ′ belong to the reﬂexive and transitive closure of
τ
−→;
let γ = a1 . . . an ∈ (Act\{τ})
∗ be a sequence of actions. Then, S
γ
=⇒ S ′ if
S =⇒
a1−→=⇒ . . . =⇒
an−→ =⇒ S ′.
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